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This paper investigates the economy-wide rate of profit in West Germany from 1960 to 
unification.  We study the behaviors of the profit share and output-capital ratio, and 
develop a simple way of graphically presenting them so a reader can immediately see 
their relative contributions to the changes in the profit rate.  Contrary to a (correct) 
conclusion drawn in a methodologically similar study on the United States, we find that 
for Germany in this period the profit share plays the dominant, though not exclusive, role 
in determining changes in the rate of profit, and the dominant explanation for changes in 
the rates of profit were wage squeezes and un-squeezes. 
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 I. Introduction 
  The rate of profit is considered by most observers of capitalism as at least one 
important indicator of the health of the economic system, and many consider it the most 
important single indicator. The classical economists, and in particular Smith, Ricardo and 
Marx, believed for theoretical reasons that the rate of profit in a capitalist system would 
tend to fall over time.  Although they did not develop any rigorous crisis theory, their 
general belief was that at least in the very long run this would lead to a breakdown of 
capitalism.  For both classicals and neoclassicals, leaving aside the difference in their 
theories as to what determines the rate of profit, higher profit rates mean greater 
investment and higher growth rates are possible, both because they provided greater 
sources of funds for investment, and because they generated higher expectations of future 
profits and through that a greater desire to invest.  Low rates of profit, on the other hand, 
not only cause slow growth, but also greatly increase the chances of recessions or 
depressions.  Hence, regardless of if there is a long run tendency for the rate of profit to 
fall, there is general agreement among economists that a significant fall in the rate of 
profit may both reflect a worsening performance of, and generate problems for the 
performance of,  a capitalist economy. 
  Two broad questions present themselves when considering the rate of profit in a 
given country in a given  period, which we will address in this work.  First, has the profit 
rate fallen, risen, or stayed about the same?  And second, whichever of these is observed, 
why has it behaved that way? 
  A question presents itself as to how to measure the rate of profit.  In fact, there is 
no such thing as “the” rate of profit; for different economic questions, one considers the rate of profit somewhat differently.  For example, one would remove taxes paid by 
private enterprises to the government from profits if one was interested in changes in the 
rate of private capital accumulation over time, while one would not remove them if one 
was concerned with changes in the share of the produced surplus retained by the workers.  
We will motivate in the appendix why we measure the rate of profit exactly the way we 
do. 
  There have not been a lot of studies in the English language literature that have 
presented full yearly results on the economy-wide (or even on the manufacturing) 
German rate of profit.  We looked carefully at five: Armstrong, Glynn and Harrison 
(1991); Reati (1986); Poletayev (1992); Shaikh (1999); and Brenner (2002,1998).  A first 
observation was that generally these studies were unclear beyond general statements 
about how they calculated the rates of profit they presented, which greatly limited the 
possibility to reproduce them to use in comparisons to study the effects of variations in 
methodologies and data sources.  Addressing this defect, in the appendix we (briefly) 
indicate our exact methodology and data sources.  Despite this limitation, one of us 
(Tutan, 2002) was able to construct graphical comparisons of our results with close 
approximations of their results.  The results of these comparisons indicated what we 
found to be a surprising degree of robustness of the economy-wide rate of profit to 
somewhat different data and somewhat different definitions of the rate of profit.  For 
those studies that presented the manufacturing rate of profit it was also very similar to our 
manufacturing rate of profit, but that was less surprising given the greater similarity of 
data sources and methodology for manufacturing. 
   Our results in this work will address the following questions. 
1) How did the private economy-wide profit rate behaved in the Federal Republic of 
Germany from 1960 to unification?  We note here again that there is fairly broad general 
agreement on the qualitative nature of this among most observers. 
2) Is the observed private economy-wide profit rate behavior fairly homogenous between 
various major sectors of the economy (as a very rough argument about high capital and 
labor mobility within a national economy might suggest), or do major sectors of the 
economy have different profit rate behaviors?  This is important for a number of reasons, 
including that historically many people have used data on the manufacturing sector as a 
proxy for the behavior of the full economy, since the data there has historically been 
much more complete than for the rest of the economy.  Clearly if it turns out that the 
profit rate in the manufacturing sector behaves significantly differently from the rest of 
the economy, then such imputations should not be made. 
3) Are changes in the rate of profit caused more by “technological changes,” changes 
having to do with capital, or are they more caused by changes in the wage rates (relative 
to productivity)?  We will perform a well known factoring of the rate of profit, briefly 
indicate limitations on this factoring concerning the “wage squeeze” vs “technological 
change” conceptual theoretical arguments, and then present some empirical results for 
West Germany in this period. In looking at data from the United States with the same 
methodology, Duménil and Lévy concluded, “We finally show that the decline in 
productivity of capital was the main factor in the fall of the rate of profit, though the 
decline in the share of profit also contributed to this evolution.”  (2001b, abstract)  We 
find basically the opposite result for the German economy.  We reproduced their results for the United States, and obtained exactly what they obtained: the difference is not in 
any methodological differences, the difference is in the markedly different behavior of 
the German and US economies in this regards. 
II. Results 
  Figure 1 presents the economy-wide profit rate. 
{Insert Figure 1 here} 
As noted in question 1 above, this manifests the generally accepted “stylized facts” about 
the rate of profit since the 1960s that one has from the more studied U.S. data.  One sees 
a general fall from the 1960s to a low point in 1981, and then a partial recovery during 
the 1980s.  The recovery is about half of the losses since 1960, similar to the fall and 
recovery in the US from its highpoint in the 1960s, although Germany was falling from 
1960 onwards while the U.S. was increasing in the 1960s until 1967.  One also sees here 
the onset of a new drop in 1992 and 1993 - this was connected to the unification process, 
a massive “perturbation” to the system that we will not investigate in this work. 
  Next we pull the economy apart into two subsectors, manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing, and consider the second question above, if the sectors are similar to 
each other in their behavior.  Put another way the question is, can we look at the whole 
economy and consider its behavior to be representative of at least the major parts of the 
economy, or is it just a mathematical average of subsectors that behave fundamentally 
d i f f e r e n t l y ?          
{Figure 2 here} 
  Figure 2 shows the profit rate in the manufacturing sector.  Very roughly, one has 
the same pattern of decline until 1982, and then recovery in the 1980s.  But there are several obvious and important differences between the manufacturing sector and the full 
economy.  First, both the drop and the recovery are more rapid.  Such more rapid declines 
and recoveries in manufacturing than the rest of the economy is a result one sees in all 
developed economies.  Second, the recovery is significantly weaker than in the total 
economy, recovering only about a third of its losses since the 1960s as opposed to a half.  
Finally, the recovery in manufacturing ends already in 1986, unlike the full economy that 
keeps recovering until 1991. 
{Figure 3 here} 
  Finally, consider the nonmanufacturing sector, Figure 3.  Here the behavior is 
quite different from both the economy as a whole and the manufacturing sector.  First, the 
decline through the 1960s and early 1970s is much less sharp.  Second, the recovery here 
can be thought of as beginning already in 1975, not in 1982 as the total economy or 1983 
as in the manufacturing sector.  And third, most strikingly, the recovery is both greater 
than the drop (even including the sharp drop in 1961), and it is sustained until 1992, with 
1993 still being flat. 
  Hence we get a clear answer to the second question we posed above.  The 
economy is not even roughly homogenous, and so it is not acceptable to take the 
manufacturing sector as a proxy for the whole economy.  The fundamentally different 
behavior of the profit rate in the manufacturing sector from the nonmanufacturing sector 
over a thirty year period poses questions about the degree of capital and labor mobility 
even within a given unified national economy, which while not a subject of this work, 
constitute an important issue for a future investigation.   Once one has determined that the total economy is the mathematical average of 
two qualitatively different subsectors, an immediate question that arises is what their 
relative weights are in the total.   Figure 4  gives the share of the two subsectors in the 
total capital stock. 
{Figure 4 here} 
One sees non manufacturing in fact has roughly twice the weight of manufacturing in the 
total profit rate in the 1960s, and climbs to three times the contribution by the 1990s.  
Given as we have seen that the rates of profit in manufacturing and nonmanufacturing 
behave qualitatively differently, this underlines the inappropriateness of using 
manufacturing, the significantly smaller of the two sectors, as a proxy for the whole 
economy. 
  We next  consider the third question posed above.  If we let Y=net output (net not 
only of depreciation but also of taxes to the government, since we are interested in private 
accumulation), P=profits, W=compensation to the workers, and K=the net capital stock, 





























which is the product of the profit share and the output-capital ratio. 
  A few words of caution are needed in regards to the interpretation of this 
decomposition.  Often this is thought of as the product of a term that reflects distribution 
times a term that reflects technical change.  These concepts are generally appropriate,  but 
one has to keep in mind possible economic scenarios that could generate contrary results.  
For example, suppose one had technical change that required new capital, raised output 
proportional to the capital increase, raised labor productivity, and no wage increases were granted.   Such a technical change would show up in the profit share term and not in the 
output capital-ratio (or without the assumption of proportional increases in Y and K it 
would show up in both).  So a simplistic identification of the profit share term as an 
indicator for distributional change would in this case not be appropriate.   As another 
example, one could have a rise in wages that could cause a change in the output-capital 
ratio.  It might go up if an incentive wage theory behavior existed, or it might go down if 
satisficing labor behavior existed.  So in this case a simplistic identification of the output-
capital term as a proxy for technological changes would not be appropriate. 
  Keeping these cautionary comments in mind, we want to now ask the question - 
are changes in the rate of profit caused more by changes in the profit share, or are they 
caused more by changes in the output-capital ratio? 
{Figure 5} 
  Figure 5 puts on a single graph the profit rate, the profit share and the output-
capital ratios for the total economy, all as indexes normalized to 100 on a base year of 
1981, the low point of the total economy rate of profit.  The graph is constructed to easily 
and immediately visually indicate which factor has changes that contribute more to the 
long term fall in the profit rate to 1981 and the subsequent partial recovery. 
  From 1960 to 1981, the profit share dropped from 150 to 100 while the output-
capital ratio dropped from 142 to 100.  As both these numbers and the graph visually 
make clear, the two factors made nearly equal contributions to the over 50% drop in the 
profit rate from 213 to 100.
1  After 1981, however, we see the recovery was driven almost entirely by an 
improved profit share, with almost no improvement in “the efficiency of capital,” the 
ouput-capital ratio. 
{Figure 6 here} 
  Consider now Figure 6 for the manufacturing sector.  We use 1981 as the base 
year again even though manufacturing hit its low in 1982, to facilitate comparisons with 
the total economy (and there is little difference between 1981 and 1982 in any case).  
Here the results are even more striking than for the economy as a whole.  Here the 
changes in the profit share are much larger than those in the output-capital ratio both 
before and after (considering first its sharp four year rise, and then its continued fall) 
1981. 
  Note one thing in passing. The change in the output-capital ratio, both before and 
after 1981, is not much different here from what it was in the total economy: just shy of 
40 before 1981, and almost no change after 1981.  It looks much flatter here over the 
early period only because the scale has changed, that is, because the profit share changed 
so much over the period compared to the case of the whole economy. 
{Figure 7} 
  In Figure 7 we look at the results for the nonmanufacturing part of the economy.  
After 1981, we see a result similar to the manufacturing results after 1981.  The output-
capital ratio changes almost not at all from 1981 to 1990, so it is the increase in the profit 
share that causes the nearly identical increase in the rate of profit.  From 1991 to 1993 the 
profit rate growth slows and then declines slightly because of a similar behavior by the 
profit share, but its slowing and final decline are attenuated by the mild rise in the output-capital ratio over those year.  Before 1981, on the other hand, the behavior is very 
different in several ways from the pre 1981 behavior in manufacturing.  Note that the 
output-capital ratio declines quite similarly to its decline in manufacturing; in 
nonmanufacturing from 140 to 100, in manufacturing from 134 to 100, both in more or 
less smooth declines.  The reduction in the “efficiency of capital” was about the same in 
the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing parts of the economy from 1960 to 1981.  But 
the profit share behavior is radically different.  While it declined from 418 to 100 in 
manufacturing, it didn’t change at all over the whole period in nonmanufacturing, being 
at 100 in both 1960 and 1981. 
  So the radically different behavior of the profit shares in manufacturing and 
nonmanufacturing was the key to the different behaviors of the profit rates in the 
corresponding sectors before both before and after 1981.  One can gain some additional 
understanding of the nature of this different behavior by looking at the actual profit 
shares. 
{Figure 8 here} 
Prior to 1981, one sees that in manufacturing the profit share started at 29.0 in 1960 and 
fell to 9.3 in 1981, while in nonmanufacturing the profit share was only 22.8 in 1960 but 
had the same value in 1981.  And after 1981 they again were totally different in their 
behavior, manifesting a sustained increase in nonmanufacturing, significantly surpassing 
its highest values from the 1960s, while in manufacturing it achieved only a four year 
recovery and then fell again.  Following the dramatic fall in manufacturing in 1992 and 
1993, the two sectors were dramatically different, with the profit share in manufacturing 
being only just over 4% while in nonmanufacturing it was over 32%.   What we have then is that for understanding the causes for the long term changes 
over 1960 to 1991 in the German rate of profit, other than for explaining the changes 
from 1960 to 1981 in nonmanufacturing, the changes in the output-capital ratio turn out 
to be of distinctly secondary importance, and the central cause for the changes in the rates 
of profit are the changes in the profit shares.  The equal contribution to the fall in the 
economy-wide rate of profit before 1981 from the profit share and the output-capital ratio 
is also seen to reflect the averaging of two parts of the economy that behaved 
diametrically opposite each other: in the non manufacturing sector the output-capital ratio 
fell by 29% while the profit share did not change at all, while in the much smaller 
manufacturing sector the output-capital ratio fell 24% but the profit share fell by 76%.  
  This then puts on the research agenda the question: what caused the changes in 
the profit shares in Germany over this period?  Further, why was the behavior of the 
profit share so different between the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors before 
1981? 




























where L is labor time, W/L is the “wage” (compensation) rate, and Y/L is labor 
productivity.  Hence we get as a direct mathematical result that if gains in the wage rate 
exceed gains in labor productivity the profit share will go down, and conversely. 
     {Figures  9,  10  and  11  here}   Two related points present themselves from all three of these diagrams.  First, 
both the labor productivity growth and the labor cost growth strike one as generally 
somewhat higher in the 1960s and the early 1970s than in the 1980s.  Second, the 
increased presence of black bars below the zero line in the latter years (which means 
rising profit shares, and given the flat output-capital ratio, is the cause of profit rate 
recovery) is caused by the growth in wages falling even faster than the falling growth in 
labor productivity.  There are differences between the three graphs, in line with the 
differences in the behavior of the two subsectors and their aggregate which we have 
already discussed above.  However, one sees clearly the  general pattern of profit rate 
recovery, where it occurred, being caused by pushing wage growth below the falling rate 
of growth of productivity.  This rule is borne out as well by manufacturing where there 
was only a short lived recovery, again caused by this dramatic reduction in wage growth, 
which then experienced continued profit share and rate deterioration even in the face of 
low wage growth because labor productivity growth dropped through the floor. 
III. Conclusions 
  We have found the following responses to the questions we posed at the end of 
section I. 
1) The economy wide rate of profit fell from 1960 until 1981, and then recovered about 
one half its value before the negative effects of unification became strong after 1991. 
2) The manufacturing sector of the economy and the nonmanufacturing sector of the 
economy behaved qualitatively differently.  Both fell from 1960, but manufacturing fell 
much more precipitously.  Nonmanufacturing began its recovery earlier and it was both 
much more sustained and stronger overall. 3) Long term changes in the rate of profit were caused much more by changes in the 
profit share than by changes in the output-capital ratio.  This was true for manufacturing 
both before and after 1981, and it was true for nonmanufacturing after 1981.  Hence it 
was true for the whole economy after 1981.  Only before 1981 in the nonmanufacturing 
sector was the fall in the profit rate caused more by a fall in the output-capital ratio, and 
that was the result of an absence of change in the profit share as opposed to a particularly 
rapid (compared to manufacturing) fall in the output-capital ratio.  In turn, increases in 
the profit share were (as they mathematically have to be) the result of more rapid growth 
in labor productivity than compensation, and conversely.  Hence, given the general 
predominance of the contributions from changes in the profit shares to the changes in 
profit rates, the differences in the changes in the growth rates of labor compensation and 
labor productivity were in general the key (but not only) factor in changes in profits rates, 
both the declines and recoveries.  While these changes in the differences between the 
rates of growth of labor productivity and compensation took place on a background 
where both labor productivity and compensation growth tended to be lower after the mid 
1970s than they had been in the 1960s and early 1970s, the key to both the falls and 
recoveries were largely wage squeezes and un-squeezes, capital’s success in pushing the 
rate of growth of labor compensation down below the rate of growth of labor productivity 
in the periods of recovery and its inability to do so in the periods that were characterized 
by falling rates of profit. Appendix 
Methodology and Data Used for Calculating the Rate of Profit 
  At the very broadest level, the concept of profit we use in this study is as follows: 
there is a certain part of the net output (gross output minus depreciation) produced that is 
directly available for private accumulation. 
   Hence our first step is to remove the sector of government from consideration, 
both its output and its capital stocks.  For output, this leaves us with net private output.  
Next we remove business payments to government (business taxes, indirect business 
taxes and profit taxes), since this value is not available to private capital for 
accumulation.  This is consistent with the recent studies by Duménil and Lévy (1999, 
appendix) and Robert Brenner (2002, 285-6).  We will see below that we cannot remove  
profit taxes, since they are not available for our aggregation categories (or in a way that 
could be aggregate to our aggregation categories).  Fortuitously these are significantly 
less than IBTs (Duménil and Lévy, 2001a, 3). 
  Third, we remove the “residential sector” from consideration.  In standard 
macroeconomic data, one lists people’s homes as part of the capital stock.  Clearly most 
people do not buy a home to maximize the return on the capital they invest in it.  The 
dynamics of capital accumulation in this sector are entirely different from that of the rest 
of the private economy, in that they are not driven by a pursuit of a maximum return on 
capital.  This correction is quantitatively very important: the residential sector represents 
roughly one half the capital stock, while it generates only a much smaller part of the 
value produced, so including it would generate a significantly different overall rate of profit.  In the data we use, this will involve removing “Dwellings” from the various 
categories we use, as detailed below. 
  Hence when we use the term “economy wide” or “total economy” we mean the 
“total private nonresidential economy after business taxes.”. 
  Following from these comments, our conceptual representation of the rate of 
profit for this study is 
Profit Rate = (Private Nonresidential Output - Depreciation - Worker Compensation - 
IBTs) / (Net Private Nonresidential Capital Stock) 
  The treatment of “Worker Compensation” requires some explanation.  OECD 
data includes a category “compensation” (COM), but this only includes compensation to 
employees.  Self employed individuals are left with net revenue after they pay costs, 
which conceptually could be thought of as the sum of their “wages” and their “profits,” 
although of course neither of these has concrete meaning for these agents.  The question 
arise of how to divide that net revenue, which is included in the economy-wide output 
figures, in a way that indicates how much of it is available for allocation for 
accumulation, how much of it should be treated like profits.  We treat the self employed 
as receiving the same average compensation as employees receive for their labor, and 
treat the net revenue they receive beyond that as profits.  For consideration of profits 
available for accumulation, this is clearly better than to not make any correction to the 
given compensation figure, which would treat the full net revenue of the self employed as 
profits.  Again, this is the same correction for this effect used in the recent studies by 
Duménil and Lévy (2001a:16 - 17) and Brenner (2002:285-6), and hence as well as being 
theoretically appropriate, this procedure makes our results comparable with theirs.     To operationalize the above concepts we have used standard OECD data sets, to 
facilitate (subsequent) cross country comparisons.  Data used in this study comes from 
the OECD  National Accounts Detailed Tables, 1960/1997, 1999 Edition, Volume II: we 
used the CD version, 1999 Edition.  The Net Capital Stock data comes from OECD 
Flows and Stocks of Fixed Capital, specifically the 1997 edition for the data for 1971 - 
1993, and the 1983 edition for the data for 1960 - 1970. 
  In terms of OECD variables, the “compensation correction” is as follows.  OECD 
data has a category EM (“employment”, which is the same as FTE, Full Time Equivalent, 
in the BEA data for the U.S.) that gives the number of employees it would require, if they 
all worked full time, to work the same number of hours as actual employees (who do not 
all work full time) worked.  They also have a category TE (“total employment”, which is 
the same as PEP, People Engaged in Production, in the BEA data for the U.S.), which 
adds the number of self employed people to EM.  Hence the number of self employed 
people is TE - EM.  We can then construct a proxy for “wages” paid to the self employed 
as (COM/EM)(TE-EM), and hence corrected compensation (CCOM), the compensation 
to both employees and self employed, is CCOM = (COM)(1+(TE-EM)/EM) = 
(COM)(TE/EM). 
  In summary: the operational definition of the rate of profit we use, with 
everything cited in this section from the above mentioned CD of OECD National 
Accounts Detailed Tables unless otherwise stated. is then 
PR = {GDP-GDP,Dwel-(CFC-CFC,Dwel)-CCOM-(IBT-IBT,Dwel)}/NCS 
where  PR =     the net profit rate GDP = the private gross domestic product, line “C.GDP.Total Industries” in table 
12 
  GDP,Dwel  =  the GDP contribution for housing, line “C.GDP.....Dwellings” in 
table  12    
  CFC =   the depreciation of capital, line “CFC.Total Industries” in table 13 
  CFC,Dwel =   the depreciation of dwellings’ capital, line “CFC.....Dwellings” in 
table 13 
  CCOM =  compensation to employees plus imputed compensation to the self 
employed, CCOM = (COM)(TE/EM) 
  COM =  compensation to employees, line “COM.Total Industries” in table 
13 (note that the line “COM.....Dwellings” has no data in it) 
  EM =    employment, line “EM.Total Industries” in table 15 (note that the 
line “EM.....Dwellings has no data)         
  TE =    “total employment,” the number of self employed plus EM, line 
“TE.Total Industries” in table 15 (note that the line 
“TE.....Dwellings” has no data) 
  IBT =    indirect business tax, line “ITX.Total Industries” in table 13 
  IBT,Dwel =  indirect business tax on dwellings, line “ITX.....Dwellings” in table 
13 
  NCS = net capital stock.  For manufacturing, it is in table 14, line “Net capital 
stock, manufacturing.”  For total industries, it is in OECD, 
1983:22-3 and OECD, 1997:34-5. REFERENCES 
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